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Executive Summary and Recommendations 
his report analyses the very broad issue of technology development, demonstration and 
diffusion with a view to identifying the key elements of a complementary global 
technology track in the post-2012 framework to be discussed at the 13
th session of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention and the 3
rd Meeting of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol (COP13/MOP 3) in Bali in December 2007 and beyond. It identifies a 
number of immediate and concrete steps that could be taken to provide content and a structure 
for such a track.  
After three introductory sections dealing with innovation and technology, investment in 
developing countries and investment and finance, the report briefly describes and analyses the 
various initiatives being taken on technology both within and outside the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Section 8 presents ideas for the way 
forward followed by brief concluding remarks. This Executive Summary highlights the key 
messages and recommendations.  
I. Key Messages 
1.  Domestic responses will remain the backbone of technology policy for addressing climate 
change. More and more countries are interested in creating a framework where innovation 
for climate change technologies flourishes, as this offers the best prospect of a competitive 
edge, technological leadership, export markets and employment opportunities. International 
collaboration will be crucial, however, in order to achieve the necessary scale, to pool 
resources, provide financing, encourage investment and speed-up knowledge-sharing.  
2.  Although technology development and diffusion are basically matters for companies, 
government help is needed in support of: i) basic research, mostly done by academic 
institutions; ii) component testing in test facilities and laboratories; and iii) full-scale 
demonstration, which is an important prerequisite for market push. Other forms of 
government support include: i) the deployment of energy-efficient technologies in the 
domestic and transport sectors (e.g. buildings and cars) and ii) consumer behaviour (i.e. 
lifestyle changes). Government policies in such areas as emissions trading, taxation, 
regulation or negotiated agreements are central to ensure that carbon has a value and that 
hitherto ‘unprofitable’ technologies become ‘profitable’. 
3.  Technology plays a fundamental role in advancing efforts to address climate change on 
three fronts: 
•  accelerating the deployment of existing low-carbon technologies, both to bring down 
the costs of technologies and to reduce emissions, which requires more ambitious 
government policies; 
•  developing and deploying new breakthrough technologies for the longer-term (beyond 
2030), which requires stepping up the speed and scale of innovation; and 
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•  avoiding, at the same time, the locking-in of high-carbon technologies in developing 
countries, i.e. estimating the incremental costs of making future (energy) investments in 
developing countries and emerging economies low carbon and paying for them, which 
require dealing with equity issues, and among other, financial transfers.  
This report mainly deals with the second front.  
4.  To accelerate innovation strategies and finance mechanisms that support the rapid 
development and deployment of promising technologies – such as CO2 capture and storage, 
biomass and biotechnology, renewables and end-use energy technologies or hydrogen 
systems – may require separate and cooperative, technology-specific research, development 
and deployment at a global level. The reason for such a complementary track, as recognised 
in studies such as the Stern report, is that pricing strategies through cap and trade alone will 
not be sufficient to provide long-term incentives for all the breakthrough technology 
development and deployment needed for stabilisation of emissions. Therefore, these 
additional technology activities are needed to focus on increasing the scale, the removal of 
barriers, finance and policy responses for key climate change technologies. Such a global 
effort could be accomplished through the creation of a ‘Consultative Group on Climate 
Innovation’, a concept that has proven to be successful in other fields, for example 
agriculture and health. Donors such as the Gates Foundation, the World Bank and national 
governments have pioneered the application of these bottom-up ‘distributed innovation’ 
strategies to product development. A Consultative Group on Climate Innovation could 
possibly facilitate international collaboration on the development of low-cost, zero-carbon 
technologies and the exchange of information about clean energy technologies. The 
proposals for an International Energy Efficiency Platform or a Sustainable Buildings 
Network point in this direction. Many countries have already undertaken long-term 
technology mapping, illustrated most recently by the EU’s Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan. 
5.  While there are initiatives within the UNFCCC, such as the Expert Group on Technology 
Transfer (EGTT), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or various initiatives on 
capacity-building, many additional and promising initiatives for the rapid development and 
deployment of technology have developed more recently outside the UN framework, such 
as the G8+5 process (involving the G8 countries plus the five emerging economies of 
China, Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa), the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate (APP) and bilateral partnerships. Since the codification of these 
initiatives in the UNFCCC would take time, it may be better to improve cooperation and 
coordination between the initiatives, possibly within the UNFCCC secretariat. These 
additional technology measures seem especially important if developing countries such as 
China and India remain outside the cap and trade framework – more creative technology 
transfer and deployment measures will be essential if they are to reduce their emissions.  
6.  Lessons for climate change from the Montreal Protocol on the phase-out of ozone-depleting 
substances should not be forgotten. These include: i) the fact that national governments 
assumed a central role in coordinating and facilitating effective national responses, ii) the 
benefits of developing a basket of technologies able to replace ozone-depleting substances, 
iii) the need for funding and iv) the importance of capacity-building in developing 
countries. Moreover, the UNFCCC and its Parties could make use of existing expertise and 
focal points on technology set up under the Montreal Protocol. This report did not address 
the issue of funding in detail but it recognises that funding will constitute a major issue. 
Funding will only follow if the structures are properly in place to make efficient use of 
finances.  LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES IN THE POST-BALI PERIOD | iii 
 
7.  There are a number of promising and profitable technologies, mainly but not only end-use 
energy efficiency technologies. Their diffusion would appear to be a natural priority. This 
could be done either within the UNFCCC or outside, as is currently mostly the case. The 
CDM or possible new post-2012 mechanisms could also be a vehicle for sector-based 
projects for technology transfer in developing countries, particularly if the terms of project 
eligibility and administrative efficiency are improved. 
8.  In parallel, existing measures and mechanisms – such as the Expert Group on Technology 
Transfer, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) within the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol – should 
continue to be improved. There is special merit to practical initiatives such as data 
collection, the setting up of monitoring, reporting and verification, developing technology 
benchmarks and best-practices or generally assessing abatement potentials and costs or 
long-term technology roadmaps, whether they are taken in the context of sectoral 
approaches for industry, the APP or national initiatives. Such initiatives can form the 
backbone for the complementary technology track, since there is at present no international 
forum or structure for the discussion and deployment of cooperative climate technology 
innovation strategies and policies. However, a post-2012 agreement, it will be critical to set 
firm reduction commitments in order to give carbon a value. Without such a value, market 
signals will remain insufficient to provide incentives to trigger the massive investment in 
low-carbon technologies. But even with such signals, additional technology-specific 
approaches and policies will be needed to stabilise emissions through massive technology 
innovation and deployment over the longer term. 
II. Recommendations 
Based on the above key messages and analysis in the principal report, we propose the following 
recommendations: 
1.  Parties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol must provide or continue to provide 
leadership in developing effective domestic responses to climate change technology 
challenge, including an efficient business environment in which investment can flourish.  
2.  As new technologies will be rapidly needed on an unprecedented scale, there should be 
more focus on technology-specific research, development and deployment both 
domestically and internationally to drive development, finance and necessary policy 
frameworks to facilitate low-carbon technologies.  
3.  The COP/MOP in Bali should consider in a complementary technology track the need for a 
global initiative on technology-specific research, development and deployment through the 
establishment of a body such as a Consultative Group on Climate Innovation to facilitate 
international collaboration on the development of low-cost, zero-carbon technologies and 
the exchange of information about clean energy technologies.  
4.  At the same time, the global community must continue to address the issue of estimating the 
incremental costs of making future (energy) investments in developing countries and 
emerging economies low carbon – to avoid lock-in – and most importantly, to identify 
strategies for financing these investments. 
5.  Among others, the following elements should be included in the complementary technology 
track: 
-  rapid agreement within the UN negotiations or another framework (e.g. G8+5) on 
measures to speed up diffusion of existing ‘profitable’ technologies, such as in 
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-  bundling the UNFCCC initiatives on technology, namely the Expert Group on 
Technology Transfer (EGTT), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and capacity 
building; 
-  applying technology innovation lessons from other fields to climate technology 
innovation and acceleration through global cooperation, product development and 
cooperative policy development and the adoption of joint standards for specific 
technologies in the power and transportation sectors; 
-  accelerating capacity-building measures for developing countries, while using the 
existing infrastructure on technology needs and technology transfer under the Montreal 
Protocol; 
-  developing the creation of a sectoral and/or programmatic CDM, or additional post-
2012 mechanisms, with a technology-transfer component; 
-  improving the coordination and cooperation between UNFCCC measures and those 
undertaken in other fora such as the G8+5, Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) on Clean 
Development and Climate and the Major Emitters Meetings; 
-  setting up a process to remove trade and investment barriers to climate change 
technology transfer; and  
-  facilitating actions that will improve data and information that are relevant for 
technology development and diffusion, such as data collection, monitoring, reporting 
and verification; technology benchmarks and best-practices; further work to assess 
abatement potentials and costs or long-term technology roadmaps, whether within 
sectoral industry approaches, the APP, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments (AWG) or national initiatives. 
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1. Introduction 
While there are different opinions on whether the stabilisation of GHG (greenhouse gas) 
emissions in accordance with the UNFCCC’s objective can be reached with technically proven 
technology,
1 the assertion that there is a need to develop new and technically unproven (i.e. 
breakthrough) technologies in the long term, and certainly beyond 2050, is uncontroversial. 
Unless a silver-bullet solution for reducing emissions can be found, a portfolio of different 
promising technologies will be needed. Among these, wind, solar and biofuels are growing 
rapidly, albeit from a small base. Other technologies, such as hydrogen, are thought to hold 
promise, but they face substantial challenges in terms of cost and large-scale implementation. 
As fossil fuels are expected to dominate the world’s energy supply portfolio for several decades, 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) may become an important bridge before we enter into a low-
carbon future. Over and above technical hurdles, the scale of the task means that widespread 
global deployment of technologies, however promising, will take decades before the cumulative 
effect of investments makes a substantive contribution to combating climate change. Such 
massive technological change depends on the right combination of public R&D investments 
(‘technology push’) and policies to provide economic incentives for private-sector innovation 
and widespread technology deployment (‘market pull’).  
A global climate change agreement can have a strong bearing on the full spectrum of the 
process of technological change. For example, commitments to GHG abatement policies are the 
source of market-pull signals that encourage innovation and deployment of low- and near-zero 
carbon technologies. Commitments to R&D efforts represent an option for enhancing and 
coordinating technology-push policies, basically on three levels: i) support for basic research, 
mostly done by academic institutions; ii) component-testing in test facilities and laboratories 
and iii) full-scale demonstration, which is an important pre-requisite for market push. Given the 
primacy of technological progress in tackling climate problems, a principal question for 
negotiators is how a global agreement would affect technology development and diffusion.  
2. Accelerating  innovation
2 
In the case of climate change, twin market failures are at play, inhibiting the emergence of 
sufficient incentive to produce technological solutions on their own.
3 The most immediately 
relevant market failure is the fact that the cost of global warming is not borne directly by GHG 
emitters, which leads to fossil-fuel prices that are ‘too cheap’ and a level of GHG emissions that 
is too high from a societal perspective. The economist’s policy prescription is to ‘put a price’ on 
                                                      
1 Pacala & Socolow (2004) and IPCC (2001) argue that the climate problem for the next 50 years could 
be solved with current technologies whereas Hoffert et al. (2002) hold that new and revolutionary 
technologies would be needed.  
2 This section is a slightly revised version of Fischer and Egenhofer (2007), while also drawing on Brewer 
(2007a).  
3 This section draws on the summary in de Coninck et al. (2007). 2 | EGENHOFER, MILFORD, FUJIWARA, BREWER & ALESSI  
 
GHG emissions – for example through a GHG tax or cap-and-trade system – thereby forcing 
individuals and firms to internalise the cost that they are placing on everyone else when they 
emit GHGs. Second, there also are market deficiencies related to the development and adoption 
of new technologies. These technology market problems are not as relevant for environmental 
problems addressed over the course of years as they are for climate policy developing over 
decades or centuries and requiring much more dramatic changes in technology. Jaffe et al. 
(2005) identify relevant types of technology market imperfections, as summarised below.
4  
•  First, due to ‘knowledge spillovers’, innovating firms cannot keep other firms from also 
benefiting from their new knowledge and, therefore, cannot capture for themselves all the 
benefits of innovation. In addition, the process of competition typically will drive a firm to 
sell a new device at a price that captures only a portion of its full value. While patents and 
other institutions are employed to protect firms’ investments in innovation, such protection 
is inherently imperfect.
5 
•  Second, ‘adoption spillovers’ may be relevant in the adoption and diffusion of new 
technology. For a number of reasons, the cost or value of a new technology to one user may 
depend on how many other users have adopted the technology. In general, users will be 
better off the more other people use the same technology, so there is a benefit associated 
with the overall scale of technology adoption (‘network externalities’). The supply-side 
counterpart, learning-by-doing, describes how production costs tend to fall as manufacturers 
gain production experience. If this learning spills over to benefit other manufacturers 
without compensation, it can represent an additional adoption externality. Finally, network 
externalities exist if a product becomes technologically more valuable to an individual user 
as other users adopt a compatible product (as with telephone and computer networks). 
These phenomena can be critical to understanding the existing technological system, 
forecasting how that system might evolve and predicting the potential effect of some policy 
or event.  
•  Third, market shortcomings arise through incomplete information. While all investment is 
accompanied by uncertainty, the uncertainty associated with the return on investment in 
innovation is often particularly large. Potential returns are also asymmetrically distributed, 
and the developer of new technology typically is in a better position to assess its potential 
than others and may find investors sceptical about promised returns. In the context of 
environmental problems such as climate change, the huge uncertainties surrounding the 
future effects of climate change and the magnitude of the policy response and, thus, the 
likely returns to R&D investment, exacerbates this problem. Another type of information 
problem relates to the inability of current policy-makers to credibly commit to a long-term 
emissions path. As a result, the long-term price signal associated with GHG reductions is 
likely to be significantly diminished relative to what it would need to be in order to achieve 
significant future reductions.  
•  Finally, incomplete information lies at the source of principal-agent problems, as when a 
builder or landlord chooses the level of investment in energy efficiency in a building but the 
energy bills are paid by a later purchaser or a tenant.  
The fact that markets under-invest in new technology (Jaffe et al., 2005) strengthens the case for 
making sure that environmental policy is designed to foster, rather than inhibit innovation. In 
                                                      
4 See Jaffe et al. (2003) for an overview of issues at the interface of environmental policy and 
technological change. 
5 An opposing incentive of conferring monopoly rights to an innovator may induce over-investment in 
redundant research efforts, as firms race to get the patent.  LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES IN THE POST-BALI PERIOD | 3 
 
cases where environmental costs have not been fully priced, it also is likely that the rate of 
investment in such technology is significantly below the socially desirable level. And it is 
unlikely that environmental policy alone can create sufficient incentives.  
According to basic economic principles, sound policy-making requires at least as many types of 
policy instruments as there are market problems to be addressed (Tinbergen, 1956). Hence, the 
optimal set of climate policies also likely includes instruments explicitly designed to foster 
innovation, and possibly technology diffusion, in addition to GHG emissions policies that 
stimulate new technology as a side effect of internalising the GHG externality. Likewise, long-
term technology R&D alone is not sufficient because it provides no direct incentives for the 
adoption of new technologies and because it focuses on the longer term, missing near-term 
opportunities for cost-effective emissions reductions (Philibert, 2003; Sandén & Azar, 2005; 
Fischer & Newell, 2004).
6  
3.  Technology and developing countries 
Arguably, the producers of new technologies are in most cases industrialised countries, although 
more and more developing countries, especially emerging economies, are developing advanced 
technologies (Brewer, 2007b). Long-term success requires that effective R&D and emissions 
policies are in place. In developed countries, that policy strategy will most effectively be a mix 
of largely market-based measures to overcome the market failures and smart public investments. 
However, the consumers of climate-friendly technologies will be all countries, including 
developing and transition economies. In these countries, poverty, limited institutional capacity, 
governance problems and other issues loom larger as barriers than the preceding market failures. 
Under these circumstances, it is naïve to expect the aforementioned market-based strategies for 
emissions reductions and innovation to generate the same results. There is a particular value of 
information exchange systems: not only do they contribute to accelerated technology 
deployment, but also in their ability to increase awareness of climate change and low-carbon 
technology solutions. They may also contribute to the enhancement of endogenous capacities 
and technologies in developing countries. For LDCs, access to technologies is a key issue, while 
for some fast-growing developing countries, concessional finance is needed for wider 
technology cooperation. 
4.  Investment and finance 
In a strategy to stabilise CO2 at about 450 ppm in the low-carbon scenario, the World Bank has 
identified an investment need for non-OECD countries of around $165 billion p.a. for electricity 
generation with current private and public sector resources funding each around half.
7 To fill 
that gap, three sources of funding for mitigation are available: i) voluntary actions, ii) 
international grants, e.g. GEF and iii) carbon trading. Carbon trade is likely to confer the biggest 
flow of funds to developing countries – between $20 billion and $120 billion per year, but 
                                                      
6 In addition to setting the proper stage for private investment, governments also have their own 
investments to manage. Public infrastructure is particularly important, as it has a long life span and 
predetermines people’s choices of where to live and work, what to consume, what sort of economic 
activities to carry out, and whom to communicate with. Infrastructure development will be a critical factor 
for both costs and overall effectiveness of climate policies. Moreover, history matters. Past infrastructure 
investment determines the present, although economists disagree on how widespread this path-
dependency is.  
7 See the World Bank’s reports to the Development Committee in the spring and fall of 2006 on the Clean 
Energy Investment Framework – which is now developed into an action plan. 4 | EGENHOFER, MILFORD, FUJIWARA, BREWER & ALESSI  
 
requires a long-term global regulatory framework (i.e. a 2050 target) with differentiated 
responsibilities – with intermediate targets. New financial instruments are required, especially to 
ensure market continuity in the post-2012 period.  
International financial institutions can be an important source of finance, policy and technical 
advice regarding the financing of investments needed for clean energy for development. Also 
the creation of new financing instruments could support this effort in several possible ways 
(World Bank, 2006 and 2007): 
•  Clean Energy Financing Vehicle (CEFV). This could provide a mechanism to transfer high-
efficiency technology by blending grants and carbon finance. 
•  Power rehabilitation financing facility. Failures of supply can cause high costs. This facility 
could enable developing countries to rehabilitate inefficient plants without loss of power 
•  Project Development Fund. ‘Bankable’ projects seem to be needed. Such projects with 
participation of the public and the private sector could be addressed with this fund. 
•  Venture capital funds for technology adoption. These funds could finance the development, 
adoption and penetration in the market of promising, new and clean technologies. 
Without changes in policy frameworks and appropriate instruments to facilitate investments in 
new technologies, developing countries would follow a carbon-intensive development path. 
There are strong pressures in emerging economies for quick expansion of energy supply, 
notably for power generation and transport fuels. These economies scramble for energy supply 
to meet growing demand generation capacity very quickly often by using existing capital stock 
and technology, and making use of domestic reserves of coal wherever possible, regardless of 
higher recurrent costs later through efficiency losses and local or regional environmental 
damage. There is a major risk that the power sector could become locked into coal. The 
investment taking place in the next 10 to 20 years could lock in very high emissions for the next 
half-century (World Bank, 2006).  
5.  Technology and the UNFCCC: Is there sufficient action? 
Under Article 4(5) of the UNFCCC, industrialised countries have a special obligation to 
promote, facilitate and finance the transfer of technology to developing countries. The focus in 
the UNFCCC has thus primarily been the transfer of technology to developing countries for 
energy efficiency, and lately for adaptation. Various processes have been introduced. The 
Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) is the main instrument. It addresses technology 
needs assessments, information exchange, enabling activities and capacity-building. In addition, 
two finance mechanisms that encourage technological diffusion through financial assistance and 
cooperation should be mentioned: the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).  
5.1  The Expert Group on Technology Transfer
8 
The Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) was established by the Marrakech Accords, 
with the objective of enhancing the implementation of Article 4(5) of the Convention, by 
analysing and identifying ways to facilitate and advance technology transfer activities and 
making recommendations to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice. 
                                                      
8 The authors would like to acknowledge the comments and information provided by Bernard Mazijn for 
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In collaboration with other agencies such as the UN Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Development Programme (UNDP), 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Climate Technology Initiative (CTI), the Expert 
Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) has worked for six years on the key elements for the 
development and transfer of technology: Technology information (clearing house
9 and 
networking with regional technology information centres), technology needs assessments, 
enabling environments and mechanisms. 
During the last years, two new areas of work have been added: Technologies for adaptation and 
innovative options for financing. 
A review of the progress of the work and terms of reference of the expert group had been 
conducted at COP12 in Nairobi. During the negotiations, it has been proposed that a second 
phase of the EGTT could build on the knowledge and expertise acquired during the first period 
and act as a think tank for the building block ‘technology’ in 2008-09. 
5.2  The Global Environmental Facility 
The UNFCCC central financial tool for technology transfer is the GEF. It is the main provider 
of grants for environmental projects in developing countries, of which climate change claims 
40% of the current yearly budget. The Marrakech Accords in 2001 clarified the role of the fund 
and created three specific new funds to generate the conditions and leverage for private 
financing, including technology transfer for adaptation and mitigation purposes: The Trust 
Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF). An adaptation fund is in preparation, which may also cover adaptation technology, but 
its size and rules of implementation have yet to be agreed.  
The Trust Fund is accessible to all countries, while the SCCF is only accessible to non-Annex 1 
countries and the LDCF is exclusively dedicated to least developed countries. The GEF has 
supported projects in over 130 countries to modernise over two dozen technologies. Most of the 
assistance is aimed at developing countries and thus the GEF fund is mainly absorbed by 
agriculture, food, water and disaster prevention measures. Its effectiveness globally has been 
often called into question, due to the modest budget of $275 million a year, even if the total 
expenditure with co-financing is nearly five times that sum.  
5.3  The Clean Development Mechanism 
Although the CDM does not have an explicit technology transfer mandate, it partly contributes 
to technology transfer by financing a number of emissions reduction projects that use 
technologies not yet available in the host country.
10 Based on a survey of participants in CDM 
projects, Haites et al. (2006) find that 33% of project developers claim that technology was 
actually transferred; meaning in this definition mostly transfer of equipment, but with some 
involvement of knowledge transfer. CDM project participants also claim that technology 
transfer represent 66% of the estimated annual emissions reductions. Interestingly, projects 
claiming technology transfer are often substantially larger projects, often involving more than 
one country. Four countries – Brazil, China, India and South Korea – account for 67% of the 
projects claiming technology transfer, and for 75% of the annual emission reductions. Haites 
also points out that the governments of China, India and South Korea mention technology 
                                                      
9 TT:CLEAR (http://ttclear.unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/index.jsp) 
10 Decision 17 CP 17/CP.7 of the Marrakech Accords, however, already reflected the intention of the 
Parties to make the CDM a tool for technology transfer to developing countries. 6 | EGENHOFER, MILFORD, FUJIWARA, BREWER & ALESSI  
 
transfer as a key eligibility criterion for CDM projects, implying that the CDM can be an 
important vehicle for technology transfer if the terms of project eligibility (i.e. explicitly 
including technology transfer) and administrative efficiency are guaranteed. 
The CDM could in particular become a vehicle for sector-based projects for technology transfer 
in developing countries. There are good arguments in favour of an extension towards a broader 
range of forestry and bio-energy projects and the development of the CDM into a more 
programmatic or sectoral crediting mechanism although many open questions, such as 
permanence, remain. More importantly, massive expansion of the CDM or other credits needs to 
be matched by demand, most of which is currently provided by the EU ETS or other Kyoto 
Protocol signatories. 
There are a number of design flaws in the CDM, which limit its scope and which have been 
highlighted, among others, by a previous ECP report on CDM. “As a market-based instrument, 
the CDM tends to favour projects that are cheapest and most secure. This has put countries with 
weak economies and a lack of adequate institutional infrastructure in a disadvantageous position 
to benefit from the CDM” – as confirmed by the Haites et al. (2006) study: “This limitation is a 
barrier to avoid fossil-fuel based development in countries in earlier stages of economic 
development.” To reduce the imbalances, complementary actions may be needed such as the use 
of different finance instruments (e.g. ODA and financing from international finance 
institutions). Another limitation of the CDM is the focus on limited types of gases, which 
excludes opportunities for a range of technologies to be developed and transferred. 
6.  A marriage of convenience with non-UNFCCC processes? 
In addition to the technology transfer to developing countries, there have been pull approaches 
to technological change within industrialised countries. The oldest of such initiatives emerged in 
1995: The Climate Technology Initiative (CTI), which has been implemented through the 
International Energy Agency. The IEA has also been tasked by the Gleneagles G8+5 process
11 
with analysis, planning and knowledge dissemination during the implementation of the 
Gleneagles Plan of Action. Within the Gleneagles process, the focus has enlarged from 
technology transfer to all stages of the deployment of new technologies, from RD&D to 
commercial deployment. 
6.1  The G8+5 process  
The G8+5 emphasise the need to stop and reverse the increase of greenhouse gas emissions, 
focusing on three actors: the Ministerial Dialogue, cooperation with the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and with the World Bank. A major commitment of the G8 Summit in Gleneagles 
was to “take forward a Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable 
Development, and to invite other interested countries with significant energy needs to join”. As 
an informal forum for discussion, it is meant to complement and reinforce the formal 
negotiations within the UNFCCC by trying to create the conditions necessary for successful 
agreement. This Ministerial Dialogue encompasses 20 countries (G8+5 together with Australia, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, Poland, South Korea and Spain), the European Commission and key 
international organisations including the World Bank, the IEA and the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
Having run throughout the UK, Russian and German Presidencies, the Japanese Presidency will 
conclude the G8 process on climate change with a final report on previous work under the 
dialogue being submitted for the consideration of G8+5 leaders in Japan. An accompanying 
                                                      
11 Involving the G8 member countries plus five developing countries – Brazil, China, India, Mexico and 
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process, the GLOBE
12 G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue, launched to shadow the G8 process, is 
expected to ensure input from stakeholders including business (e.g. the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development) and environmental NGOs. 
6.2  The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Development and Climate Change (the APP) was created in 
2006 by Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and the US, and is now joined by Canada. 
Its modus operandi can be characterised as a sectoral approach combining cooperation on the 
development and deployment of technologies with reforms for removing barriers to mitigation 
potential (Fujiwara, 2007a). 
It is a public-private partnership on a regional scale, encouraging interaction of business, 
government and researchers from partner countries. Through eight Task Forces, it focuses on 
specific key sectors to address clean development: three energy supply sectors (cleaner fossil 
energy, renewable energy and distributed generation, power generation and transmission); and 
five energy-intensive sectors (steel, aluminium, cement, coal mining, buildings and appliances). 
The Task Forces are designed to facilitate the development, diffusion, deployment and transfer 
of cost-effective, cleaner and more efficient technologies and practices among the partners 
through concrete and substantial cooperation so as to achieve practical results.  
These Task Forces formulated Action Plans together with a portfolio of 110 projects ranging 
from technology development and deployment to information exchange and technical 
cooperation. Most Task Forces put a special effort into exchange of information, especially 
about best practice. Another focus aims to assess technology options and estimate their potential 
to reduce GHG emissions. 
6.3 Major  Economies’  Meetings 
Following the Japanese ‘Cool Earth 50’ proposal of May 2007, the US launched on 31 May 
2007 the idea of a ‘major emitters’ initiative’ – later to become major economies’ meetings 
(MEE), crucially composed of all large emitters of GHGs in both developed and developing 
countries, with the aim of agreeing on emissions reductions. The objective of the initiative is to 
develop and contribute to a post-Kyoto framework on energy security and climate change by the 
end of 2008. This effort is meant to complement existing national, bilateral, regional and 
international programmes to address the long-term challenge of global climate change as well as 
highlight the US intention to take action on climate change at home and abroad.
13 Importantly, 
all participants, although reflecting a diversity of perspectives, agreed on the central role of the 
UNFCCC as the global forum for addressing climate change. 
The discussion focused on five key areas: i) low-carbon fossil power generation, ii) transport, 
iii) land use, iv) market penetration of technologies and v) energy efficiency and finance. 
Hence, the MEE initiative takes a similar approach as the Gleneagles Plan of Action. There 
were proposals to broaden the agenda to include a long-term global goal for greenhouse gas 
reduction, incentives and finance for clean technology investments, adaptation, deforestation, 
                                                      
12 GLOBE, which stands for the Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment, is an 
organisation comprising legislators from around the world, including the G8+5 countries. 
13 The first Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change was held on 27-28 
September  in Washington, D.C. and was attended by senior representatives of 17 Major Economies, as 
well as the UN and the EC (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, South Africa, United Kingdom and the EU). 8 | EGENHOFER, MILFORD, FUJIWARA, BREWER & ALESSI  
 
reforestation and afforestation, among others. Further meetings are scheduled to take place after 
the COP/MOP in Bali.  
6.4  Global sectoral industry approaches  
There is an increasing political momentum behind ‘global sectoral approaches’. Some industries 
are concentrated in such a way that a small number of companies represent a large share of the 
world market and a significant share of the global GHG emissions. The examples of such 
industries include aluminium, cement, steel, float glass and a few heavy chemical industries. At 
the same time, these industries produce and trade goods that are globally priced. In some cases, 
they are also easily transportable. While there are very different models of approaches across 
sectors, they all attempt to combine two objectives:  
•  Induce changes to technologies through either development of new and breakthrough 
technologies or accelerated deployment of existing technologies, essentially by means of 
cooperation between the firms.  
•  Engage developing countries in reducing emissions and taking on emissions reduction 
commitments. 
As an intended side-effect, sectoral approaches can reduce unevenness of distributional impacts 
between firms within the same sector that arise as a result of uncoordinated local, national or 
regional climate change policies.  
While global industry sectoral approaches (e.g. initiatives by the Cement Sustainability 
Initiative, International Aluminium Institute, International Iron and Steel Institute) are only 
emerging, it is yet unclear in which direction they will develop. However, global sectoral 
industry approaches may potentially improve: 
•  data collection on the state of the sector, e.g. emissions (actual and projected), applied 
technologies, technology benchmarks and best-practice, 
•  identification and spread of best-practice and the 
•  development and diffusion of technology. 
7.  Technology-oriented agreements and their limitations 
Most of these initiatives can be described as so-called ‘technology-oriented agreements’ (TOAs) 
or at least have elements of them. Technology-oriented agreements stress the need for a 
portfolio of R&D investments across a spectrum of technology classes, and integration of 
energy technology development as part of a larger comprehensive strategy.  
Technology-oriented agreements are expected to address important failures in the market for 
technological innovation. Still, they will operate best in conjunction with appropriate emissions-
reduction policies, particularly market-based ones. This complementarity could be mutually 
reinforcing: as emissions-reduction policies spur the uptake of new technologies and increase 
the profitability of innovation, TOAs spur additional innovation to lower the costs of mitigation 
and improve the social and political acceptability of emissions targets. TOAs could be 
negotiated separately, linked together or incorporated into the climate policy framework in a 
Policies and Measures approach. More modest TOAs have the advantage of being able to be 
negotiated and implemented by a smaller set of countries, potentially outside of the UNFCCC.  
 LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES IN THE POST-BALI PERIOD | 9 
 
Box 1. Technology-oriented agreements  
A Global Energy Technology Strategy in international cooperation with public and private sectors 
has been proposed (Humphreys, 2001; Edmonds, 2003). The proposal has been further developed 
to address the lack of incentives for short-term action and the deployment of advanced 
technologies. Barrett (2002, 2003) has proposed a new R&D protocol based on collective funding 
of basic research into the development of new technologies and on standard protocols for the 
adoption and diffusion of new technologies around the world. He also suggests that the long-term 
focused proposal needs to be combined with further protocols for the short-term options such as 
domestic measures or emissions trading. 
De Conink et al. (2007) survey the range of existing TOAs and identify four broad types:  
1)  knowledge sharing and coordination; 
2)  research, development and demonstration (RD&D);  
3)  technology transfer and  
4)  technology deployment mandates, standards and incentives.  
To date, most existing TOAs related to climate change fall into the first category of knowledge 
sharing. These initiatives include the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF), Methane 
to Markets Partnership or the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy, and most 
recently, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Development and Climate (APP) or the existing global 
sectoral industry approaches. Agreements of this type provide relatively low-cost means to 
exchange information, promote common standards and facilitate innovation; however, their 
effectiveness is limited by the voluntary, non-binding nature of their framework.  
To date, RD&D agreements, i.e. category 2, have primarily focused on fundamental research 
and demonstration projects, where expenses may be high and where the technology is too far 
from commercialisation for intellectual property rights to be a concern. Examples of these cost-
sharing arrangements include the ITER fusion reactor, the Solvent Refined Coal II 
Demonstration Project (SRC-II) and some IEA research programmes. Technology cooperation 
and RD&D agreements will most likely find their limits, however, when the technology moves 
from the pre-competitive to the post-competitive stage.  
Technology transfer, i.e. category 3, has been attempted within the UNFCCC. One of the 
shortcomings is that most advanced technologies consist of integrated products, which depend 
to large extent on know-how. Thus, simply transferring patents does not help.  
Category 4 of technology mandates is best exemplified by the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). In the climate arena, one could imagine (and 
some have proposed) harmonised standards for renewable energy, building codes and energy 
efficiency, or requirements for carbon capture and sequestration. These kinds of agreements fall 
more into market-pull strategies. While they have bigger potential for generating emissions 
reductions by virtue of their sector-by-sector nature, they raise cost-effectiveness questions in 
comparison to broad-based methods. On the other hand, in an international framework with 
incomplete participation, performance-based standards can have less effect on competitiveness 
than emissions price policies, since standards do not impose the additional direct cost of 
emissions, resulting in smaller product-price increases (Bernard et al., 2007; Fischer & Fox, 
forthcoming). 
The use of TOAs as an effective substitute for an emissions-based approach is limited to the 
category of standards, mandates, or substantial incentives, i.e. category 4, as they would need to 
be applied on a sector-by-sector, if not technology-by-technology, basis. This approach may 10 | EGENHOFER, MILFORD, FUJIWARA, BREWER & ALESSI  
 
make the most sense in certain specific settings: for highly trade-sensitive sectors, in which 
agreement upon targets and timetables is difficult; for sectors not otherwise covered by 
emissions trading programmes; for sectors that can benefit from international coordination; and 
for situations where significant ancillary benefits are foreseen. For a comprehensive programme 
of reducing global emissions, TOAs are best viewed as playing a strong supporting role, with a 
well-designed emissions-reduction policy with long-term targets as the main instrument and 
driver. 
8.  Which way forward?  
Most TOAs focus on ‘knowledge sharing and co-ordination’. They are relatively low cost, 
simple and politically uncontroversial. On the other hand, their impact will be limited. There are 
few examples of R&D cooperation at international level. Technology transfer, the third category 
has been largely confined to the UNFCCC. The fourth category, technology mandates has been 
tried within the G8+5 process as well as outside, but it has not yet been applied in a major way.  
8.1  More focus on technologies rather than on policies?  
In applying the wedges-approach, the WRI report entitled “Scaling up” (Wellington et al., 2007; 
7) makes the case that a necessary precondition for the development and deployment of new 
technologies is a massive amount of information. Policy-makers’ and business executives’ 
decisions are only as good as the information allows. In order to make “the wedges reality”, the 
report proposes research to initially focus on providing the necessary information in three areas 
and to engage decision-makers in policy and business (Wellington, et al., 2007; 7): 
Technology  The scope, scale and availability of the technologies in question, as well as the 
risks and other impacts associated with them. 
Investment  How domestic and international investors respond to the incentives created by 
policy? In turn, how the combination of policy and commercial opportunity 
affect capital flows from the private sector and development assistance. 
Policy  Agreements, trade conditions and other factors that affect international 
deployment of the technology. The successful realisation of any wedges 
depends on understanding decision-making processes in the country of region 
in which it is to be implemented.  
Although not entirely technology-specific, this nevertheless constitutes a somewhat different 
approach than a more horizontal technology approach as for example proposed by Stern (2006; 
chapter 16). Although ultimately, when technologies move closer to demonstration and 
deployment, we can expect that market conditions combined with smart government policy, 
such as removing institutional and other non-market barriers, will be the key drivers for 
deployment of new technologies. While technology-neutral policies are strongly preferred as 
they leave decisions for resource allocation in the hands of market participants, the market fails 
in three areas: i) long-term technology development, demonstration and deployment of 
breakthrough energy technologies; ii) energy efficiency in domestic sector and iii) consumer 
behaviour. Price signals may only emerge gradually or not provide necessary incentives to bring 
technologies to the point of deployment. There is a good understanding of the key technologies, 
capable of addressing climate change and typically include technologies for energy efficiency 
and conservation, fuels switching, CO2 Capture and Storage (CCS), nuclear fission, renewable 
electricity and fuels and forests and agricultural sinks and hydrogen technologies (e.g. Pacala & 
Socolow, 2004; Edmonds, 2007 and Wellington, 2007).  LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES IN THE POST-BALI PERIOD | 11 
 
8.2  Establishing a Consultative Group on Climate Innovation? 
The proposal for the Consultative Group on Climate Innovation is a somewhat more concrete 
version of the above strategy. The starting point is the need for a complementary technology 
track including innovation strategies, and finance mechanisms that support the rapid 
development and deployment of low-carbon technologies, all within new forms of global 
infrastructure.
14 
The consultative group concept has its origins in the 1960s. While it started as a ‘big science’ 
effort, it has evolved considerably. It now relies increasingly on a more distributed and 
decentralised approach among donors in areas such as agricultural productivity and natural 
resource protection.
15 This new approach goes beyond research; the evolving distributed 
innovation approaches focus on product development, targeted analysis, finance and cooperative 
policy development. An international framework and strategy supports the work on the complex 
global public goods involved in these fields, whereas no such cooperative architecture exists 
today for innovation in climate technology. The EU’s proposal for an International Energy 
Efficiency Platform or suggestions for a Sustainable Buildings Network point to a similar 
direction. The new Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Pan) proposed by the European 
Commission (European Commission, 2007c) can be seen as an EU variation of the same 
approach. Many countries have undertaken technology-mapping exercises. 
Box 2. What is distributed innovation?  
Public interventions in the low-carbon energy sector often have focused only on supporting 
information-sharing networks that lack the incentives or infrastructure to drive massive innovation 
and then product development and deployment. To the extent that public investments have 
extended beyond information-sharing, they have largely supported long-term demonstration 
projects or prototype development. The current surge in venture capital is largely directed towards 
a relatively small number of sectors (e.g. solar); these investments are helpful but are insufficient 
to drive large-scale technology development in multiple energy sectors. A new global climate 
technology innovation initiative – a ‘distributed’ model of climate innovation and 
commercialisation – can overcome these failures. Distributed innovation strategies bring together 
the international expertise needed to develop and deploy new technologies. Teams include project 
leaders with business expertise to ensure that research and development are linked to viable 
commercialisation strategies. Robust information technology tools support these teams, enabling 
people throughout the globe to collaborate together; the distributed innovation approach 
assembles the best people for a task regardless of their location. These strategies enable teams to 
tap innovative thinking from unexpected places; these tools could ‘open’ the climate innovation 
process in the same way that a growing number of companies now supplement their own in-house 
research and development capacity in other areas.  
Source: Milford (2007a, 2007b). 
                                                      
14 While the idea of a complementary technology track is not new, the essential role of climate-
technology-innovation policies has been overshadowed by market-based theory, and the issue of how to 
structure and implement such a complementary technology-based strategy has received remarkably little 
attention. The Council of the European Union recently endorsed a proposal that cap and trade be 
“supplemented” by technology strategies for the upcoming Bali negotiations but offered few details about 
how the concept could be put in place. (See Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on 
Climate Change,” 30 October 2007.) 
15 The GLCA report derives its recommendation for a CGCER from a 2006 Summary Report of the 
International Task Force on Public Goods, Meeting Global Challenges: International Cooperation in the 
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The proposal for a Consultative Group on Climate Innovation (Milford, 2007a, 2007b) builds on 
the work by the Club of Madrid and the United Nations Foundation, acting through the Global 
Leadership for Climate Action. It proposes a more expansive new global architecture and 
strategy for climate technology innovation in the post-2012 framework to cover technology 
innovation for mitigation (and perhaps adaptation), as well as related finance initiative, create 
decentralized and cooperative global structure around climate technology innovation 
(‘distributed innovation’ – see Box 2 above). In addition, it addresses many issues that go well 
beyond research such as climate technology product development, finance, business models, 
policy analysis, and related strategies to scale-up existing technologies and create new 
breakthrough innovations, linking of developed and developing country technology initiatives 
as well as the involvement of private and public sectors and civil society. 
8.3  Learning from the Montreal Protocol  
Technology has also been a focal point of the Montreal Protocol. Although the Montreal 
Protocol and a potential climate change agreement will necessarily have different features, as 
they deal with different problems, there may nevertheless be a number of lessons that can apply. 
First, governments emerged as major stakeholders in the Protocol and assumed a central role in 
coordinating and facilitating effective national responses, including those on technology. 
Second, the Montreal Protocol developed a basket of promising technologies able to replace 
ozone-depleting substances. However, an important difference from climate change is that the 
technology options were known. A third element of success was funding, although the scale for 
climate change is different. Less-known is the contribution of the Montreal Protocol to assess 
the country specific requirements, training in adapting to new technologies and exchange of 
information on technology options before making the final decision. This element was 
instrumental in capacity-building in developing countries. In practical terms, the Montreal 
Protocol has developed an infrastructure for technology assessment and transfer, which could 
eventually be used by the UNFCCC.  
8.4 Effective  national/regional technology approaches 
In the search for a global response to the technology challenge, it should not be forgotten that 
the backbone of technology policy will likely be national or in the case of the EU, a regional 
approach. Incentives for actions are stronger than for abatement policies per se as the 
development and deployment of advanced low-carbon technologies do not only offer the 
prospect of lower emissions but also hold out the promise of technological leadership, a 
competitive edge, export markets and employment opportunities. More and more countries are 
joining the climate technology race. 
The EU integrated energy and climate change package, launched on 10 January 2007, is the 
specific EU response, manifesting the EU’s will to broaden its reflection on its future energy 
systems, taking into account increasing market liberalisation and globalisation, environmental 
pressures, technological challenges and the growing import dependency from politically 
unstable regions. Technology was one of the priorities. It includes actions in the energy sector 
(e.g. cleaner fossil energy, renewable energy, power generation and transmission) as well as 
cross-cutting issues (e.g. R&D and energy efficiency). To address the choice between 
technology-neutral and technology-specific approaches, the EU in principle has taken a 
‘horizontal’ approach. On the condition that a global agreement is reached,
16 the EU has 
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proposed to accept a binding absolute emissions reduction commitment of 30% by 2020 based 
on 1990 levels. Failing that, it has undertaken a ‘firm independent commitment’ to achieve at 
least a 20% reduction in overall emissions by 2020 and a 20% reduction of primary energy 
consumption by 2020 and to develop a European Strategic Energy Technology Plan. 
Nevertheless, the package foresees a number of measures for specific sectors under prioritised 
themes. For example, EU actions for energy efficiency improvements cover appliances and 
buildings as well as heat and electricity generation, transmission and distribution. There are two 
notable areas where a sector-specific approach prevails: renewables and carbon capture and 
storage. A binding target of 20% of renewable energy in total energy consumption by 2020, 
should ensure accelerated deployment of renewable energy technologies, essentially to bring 
down costs. As an example, for wind energy, the IEA estimates that each doubling of capacity 
can lower the costs by 18-20%
  , although such ‘learning curves’ differ for different 
technologies, mainly depending on how mature they are. In addition, the EU has endorsed a 
carbon capture and sequestration policy, among others, by bringing forward a legal and policy 
framework for carbon capture and geological storage by the beginning of 2008, as well as an 
incentive framework, support programmes and external elements such as technology 
cooperation with key countries on CCS (see Appendix 1). Similar technology packages are put 
together or are already in operation in other countries. 
Domestic approaches should also include removing trade and investment barriers to climate 
change technology transfer. There are numerous trade barriers in developing countries and 
industrialised countries that constrain exports of ‘greenhouse gas intensity-reducing 
technologies’ in all directions but notably North-South, South-North and South-South (Brewer, 
2007b). For developing countries, removing ownership restrictions for foreign ownership has 
been identified as one such measure.  
9. Final  remarks 
Returning to the theme of global responses to technology within the UNFCCC or outside that 
framework, this report has examined the vexed question of technology in the global climate 
change negotiations. It has attempted to address the key questions that will remain central to the 
negotiations, but its answers are only partial. Nevertheless, the preceding section 8 has 
identified a number of concrete steps for immediate and longer-term action. We recognise that 
more research will be needed before we can comprehensively answers the questions below.  
1.  What is necessary to further accelerate deployment of existing commercially available 
technologies including energy efficiency? 
2.  How can international technology cooperation be scaled up to promote innovation and 
development of newer technologies? 
3.  What are the full incremental costs of making future energy investment in developing 
countries low carbon? How can these costs be met? By whom?  
4.  What is the role of the UNFCCC in providing a catalyst for change?  
5.  How can voluntary initiatives and other multilateral initiatives outside of the UNFCCC 
contribute towards achieving a stabilisation goal?  
6.  How can additional support for technology (through UNFCCC or processes outside of the 
Convention) leverage commitments for actions by the advanced developing countries? 
7.  Is there a role for technology-type agreements? How could these be taken forward and 
financed? 14 | 
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Appendix 1. The EU Energy and Climate Package
∗ 
The European Commission has proposed a comprehensive package of measures to combat 
climate change and boost the EU’s energy security and competitiveness. The package sets a 
series of ambitious targets on greenhouse gas emissions and renewable energy and aim to create 
a true internal market for energy and strengthen effective regulation. The key elements of the 
package include the following. 
Strategic objectives 
•  An EU objective in international negotiations of 30% reduction in GHG emissions by 
developed countries by 2020 compared to 1990. In addition 2050 global GHG emissions 
must be reduced by up to 50% compared to 1990, implying reductions in industrialised 
countries of 60-80% by 2050. 
•  An EU commitment to achieve at least a 20% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 
compared to 1990. 
A European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan) 
The so-called SET-Plan (European Commission 2007b) is meant to develop a vision towards a 
low-carbon economy. The European Commission Proposal, published on 22 November 
(European Commission 2007c), focuses on a number of specific steps to assist implementation 
of the EU energy package such as the creation of an Energy Technology Information System, 
public private partnerships in the different technological fields, better coordination of EU 
research centres through a European Energy Research Alliance grouping together European 
institutes, and more emphasis on infrastructure developments. It takes into account that  
•  By 2020 technologies will have to make the 20% renewable target a reality by permitting a 
sharp increase in the share of lower cost renewables; 
•  By 2030 electricity and heat will increasingly need to be produced from low carbon sources 
and extensive near-zero emission fossil fuel power plants with CO2 capture and storage. 
Transport will need to increasingly adapt to using second generation biofuels and hydrogen 
fuel cells. 
•  For 2050 and beyond, the switch to low carbon in the European energy system should be 
completed with an overall European energy mix that could include large shares for 
renewables, sustainable coal and gas, sustainable hydrogen, and, for those member states 
that want, Generation IV fission power and fusion energy. 
The first SET-Plan is foreseen for endorsement by the 2008 Spring European Council. 
Sectoral objectives 
•  More energy efficient buildings, appliances, equipment, industrial processes and transport 
systems; 
•  Developing biofuels, in particular second generation biofuels, to become fully competitive 
alternatives to hydrocarbons; 
•  Getting large scale offshore wind competitive within the short term and paving the way 
towards a competitive European offshore supergrid; 
                                                      
∗ Source: Fujiwara, N. (2007), The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Energy: What it 
is and what it is not, CEPS Policy Brief No. 144, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, October. LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES IN THE POST-BALI PERIOD | 17 
 
•  Getting photovoltaic electricity competitive to harness solar energy; 
•  Using full cell and hydrogen technologies to exploit their benefits in decentralised 
generation and transport; 
•  Sustainable coal and gas technologies, particularly carbon capture and storage; 
•  Leading in fourth generation fission nuclear reactors and future fusion technology to boost 
the competitiveness, safety and security of nuclear electricity, as well as reduce the level of 
waste.  
Sectoral targets 
•  A target of 10% minimum interconnection levels 
•  A binding target of 20% of its overall energy mix will be sourced from renewable energy by 
2020 
•  A minimum target for biofuels of 10% 
•  An increase in its annual spending on energy research for the next seven years by at least 
50% 
•  Saving 20% of total primary energy consumption by 2020 
•  Construction of 12 large-scale demonstration plants in Europe by 2015 
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Appendix 2. Major global partnerships on energy and climate change
∗ 





The GGFR is the World Bank-led initiative launched at the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (WSSD). It is a public-private partnership that 
facilitates and supports national efforts to use currently flared gas by promoting 
effective regulatory frameworks and tackling the constraints on gas utilization. 
Poverty reduction is also an integral part of the programme.  
Partnership for 
Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles 
(PCFV)(2002-) 
The PCFV was also launched at the 2002 WSSD as a public-private partnership. 
It will help reduce vehicular air pollution in developing countries through the 
promotion of clean fuels and vehicles, and will focus initially on the elimination 
of lead in gasoline and the phase down of sulphur in diesel and gasoline fuels 





The JREC was launched following the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
agreed at the 2002 WSSD. Ministers and senior officials identified a large range 
of policy objectives that can be addressed through increased renewable energy 






The CSLF focuses on development of improved cost-effective technologies for 
the separation and capture of CO2 for its transport and long-term safe storage. Its 
purpose is to make these technologies broadly available internationally and to 
identify and address wider issues relating to carbon capture and storage. 
International 
Partnership 
for the Hydrogen 
Economy (IPHE), 
(2003-) 
The IPHE aims to accelerate the transition to a hydrogen economy. It serves as a 
mechanism to organize and improvement effective, efficient and focused 
international research, development, demonstration and commercial utilization 





The Partnership is an initiative that advances cost-effective, near-term methane 
recovery and use as a clean energy source. Its goal is to reduce global methane 
emissions in order to enhance economic growth, strengthen energy security, 
improve air quality, improve industrial safety, and reduce GHG emissions. 
FutureGen, 
(2005-) 
FutureGen is a public-private partnership to build a first-of-its-kind coal-fuelled, 






The REEEP was conceived at the 2002 WSSD and established in 2004. It is a 
public-private partnership that structures policy and regulatory initiatives for 
clean energy and facilitates financing for energy projects. Its aim is to accelerate 
the integration of renewables into the energy mix and to advocate energy 
efficiency as a path to improved energy security and reduced carbon emissions, 




Countries work together to lay the groundwork for the 4th generation nuclear 





GNEP was first announced in 2006. GNEP seeks to develop worldwide 
consensus on enabling expanded use of clean, safe and affordable nuclear energy 
to meet growing electricity demand. It proposes a nuclear fuel cycle that 
enhances energy security.  
Sources: http://www.cslforum.org/; www.methanetomarkets.org/; www.iphe.net/; www.worldbank.org/; 
www.futuregenalliance.org/about.stm; /www.reeep.org/; www.unep.org/pcfv/; 
ec.europa.eu/environment/jrec/index_en.htm; gif.inel.gov/; http://www.gnep.gov/ 
                                                      
∗ Source: Fujiwara, N. (2007), The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Energy: What it 
is and what it is not, CEPS Policy Brief No. 144, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, October. LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES IN THE POST-BALI PERIOD | 19 
 
Table 2. Major bilateral global partnerships on energy and climate change 
Partnership Description 
US Fossil Energy 
Bilateral Agreements 
The formats and goals are set bilaterally. 
US ENERGY STAR 
agreements 
There are international agreements to promote certain ENERGY STAR 
qualified products. They aim to unify voluntary energy-efficiency labelling 
programmes in major global markets and make it easier for partners to 




The I-NERI is a US programme designed to foster collaborative research 
and development with international partners in advanced nuclear energy 
systems. It has implemented bilateral collaborative agreements. 
EU bilateral 
cooperation initiatives  





Table 3. Multilateral global partnerships and their main participants 
  APP APP APP APP APP APP APP EU  EU  EU  EU   
 Au  Ca  Ch  In  Ja  Ko  US  Fr  Ge  It  UK  EU 
GGFR   ○       ○  ○    ○  ○ 
PCFV  ●  ●  ●    ●       
J R E C           ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
CSLF  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
IPHE  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
MMP  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
REEEP  ○  ○    ●  ●  ○  ●  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
GIF  ●    ●  ●  ●  ●    ●  
GNEP  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●    ◘  
Legend: ○: member and donor; ●: member; ◘: observer 
Note: The EU is a donor to GGFR, and led the launch of JREC. The European Commission is a member of CSLF, 
IPHE, and REEEP. EURATOM is a member of GIF.  
Table 4. Bilateral global partnerships and their main participants 
 Au  Ca  Ch  In  Ja  Ko  US  Fr  Ge  It  UK  EU 
Fossil Fuel  ●  ●  ●a  ●b     ○    ●  ●  
ENERGY 
STAR 
●  ●    ●  ○      ● 
I-NERI   ●    ●  ●  ○  ●        
Cooperation       ●c  ●d     ●      ○ 
Legend: ○: Host country; ●: Its partners.  
a A bilateral Fossil Energy Protocol has been extended to 2010. There is a public-private partnership, US-
China Oil and Gas Industry Forum.  
b An US-India Energy Dialogue was launched in May 2005. 
c An EU-China Partnership on Climate Change was agreed in September 2005.  
d An EU-India Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change was agreed in September 2005. 20 | 
Appendix 3. Agenda of the ECP meeting on 3 October 
 and List of Participants 
Fourth ECP Seminar 
 
STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY FOR THE UNFCCC  
AND CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE:  




3 October 2007 
09:00   Registration and coffee 
09:30 Welcome  by  Christian Egenhofer, CEPS 
09:35 Introduction by ECP co-chairs: Frank Convery, Heritage Trust Professor of 
Environmental Policy at University College Dublin & President of the European 
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE); Bo Kjellén, Senior 
Fellow Stockholm Environment Institute and Former Chief Climate Negotiator of 
Sweden 
SESSION I. Setting the scene  
-  What are the full incremental costs of making future energy investment in developing 
countries low carbon? How can these costs be met? By whom?  
-  How to further accelerate deployment of existing commercially available technologies 
including energy efficiency? 
 
09:45  The critical role of technology for international climate change policy: a taxonomy 
of climate change and technology 
Introduction to Background Paper No. 1 and No. 2 by Thomas Brewer, Georgetown 
University, Washington, D.C. 
09:55  Comments by Anders Wijkman, Member of European Parliament & Chair, 
Technology working group, GLOBE G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue 
10:05  Comments by Chris Dodwell, Head of UK climate change delegation 
10:20  Open Discussion 
11:10  Coffee Break 
 
SESSION II. Scaling up 
-  How can international technology cooperation be scaled up to promote innovation and 
development of newer technologies?  
-  How can voluntary initiatives and other multilateral initiatives outside of the UNFCCC 
contribute towards achieving a stabilisation goal?  
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11:25 Scaling-up   
 Hilary  McMahon, World Resource Institute (WRI), Washington  
11:40   Scaling up the CDM 
  Ulrika Raab, Member of the CDM Executive Board 
11:55  Open discussion  
12:50  Light lunch at CEPS 
13:50  Can AP6 be scaled up to global level? Presentation of Background Paper No. 3 by 
Noriko Fujiwara, CEPS  
13:55   Comments by Christian Josis, ArcelorMittal 
14:05  Comments by Koichi Akaishi, Executive Director, Brussels Office, Japan Machinery 
Center for Trade and Investment 
17 
14:15 Open  discussion  
 
SESSION III. Next steps towards a technology strategy  
 
-  The role of the UNFCCC in providing a catalyst for change 
-  How can additional support for technology (through UNFCCC or processes outside of the 
Convention) leverage commitments for actions by the advanced developing countries?  
-  Is there a role for technology-type agreements? How could these be taken forward and 
financed?  
 
15:10  Kick-off by Lew Milford, President, Clean Energy Group, US  
15:35 Responses  by Nick Campbell, Chairman Climate Change Working Group, Business 
Europe and Francois Dassa, EDF 
15:50 Open  discussion 
16:50  Conclusions and wrap-up by the Chair and further information by Christian 




                                                      
17 The Japan Machinery Center for Trade and Investment (JMC) is a non-profit organization that was 
established, under the authorization by the Japanese government (Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry) to promote sound development of foreign trade and direct investment. 22 | 
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About the European Climate Platform 
(ECP) 
The ECP is a joint initiative of the Climate Policy Research Programme 
(Clipore) of the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research 
(Mistra) in Stockholm and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in 
Brussels. Established in 2005, the ECP aims to facilitate interaction within 
the policy research community, mainly but not exclusively in Europe. Its 
working methods consist of bringing together  a select number of policy-
makers, negotiators and experts to vigorously debate key topics in the area 
of international climate change policy and to widely disseminate its 
conclusions. The ECP actively seeks dialogue with policy-makers and other 
stakeholders while being dedicated to academic excellence, unqualified 
independence and policy relevance. The ECP is governed by a steering 
group, drawn from government and academia. For further information, see: 
http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=484 . 
About the Climate Policy Research Programme 
(CLIPORE) 
Clipore is an international research programme that aims to stimulate policy-
oriented research that contributes to moving forward global efforts to combat 
climate change. A steady and integrated process of research and dialogue 
with stakeholders lies at the foundation of the Clipore programme: spawning, 
developing, sharing, scrutinizing and refining ideas. The programme is 
comprised of two large climate policy research projects, independent 
university positions and the Clipore Policy Forum. For more information see: 
http://www.clipore.org  
About the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS) 
Situated in the nexus between academia, business and policy-making, 
CEPS performs a unique role as an independent analyst and critic of 
European policy. CEPS’ core expertise is the conduct of policy research on 
European affairs including climate change and the broad dissemination of its 
findings through a regular flow of publications and events. (See: 
www.ceps.be on CEPS in general and for a description of its energy, climate 




Place du Congrès 1 
1000 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel: +32 (0)2-229 39 11 






179 96 Svartsjö, Sweden
Tel: +46 (0)8-560 40850
Fax: +46 (0)8-560 40851
http://www.clipore.org 